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P 120833Z MAR 07
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0236
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0783
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0311
RUEHKS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0271
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USARPAC COMMAND CENTER FT SHAFTER HI
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0001
RUEHWW/BAGHDAD GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0726

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000047

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - REPLACED SBU WITH C PARAMARKINGS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/12/2032

TAGS: [MARR](#) [PGOV](#) [PINS](#) [PREL](#) [JA](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA AGREES TO PRESS AHEAD ON FRF PLAN

CLASSIFIED BY: KEVIN K. MAHER, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. CONSULATE
GENERAL NAHA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA TRAVELED TO OKINAWA FOR A "PRIVATE" BUT WIDELY REPORTED MEETING WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL TO DISCUSS THE WAY FORWARD ON IMPLEMENTING THE FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY (FRF) PLAN THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE OCTOBER 2005 AND MAY 2006 SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS. MINISTER KYUMA AGREED TO REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FLEXIBILITY TOWARDS THE GOVERNOR IN TERMS OF THE GOVERNOR'S REQUEST FOR CHANGES TO THE PLAN. WE AGREED TO PERSUADE THE OKINAWA GOVERNOR AND NAGO MAYOR TO ACCEPT THE CURRENT PLAN WITHOUT REVISIONS. MINISTER KYUMA SAID JAPAN FULLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. ON IRAQ, AND THAT HE IS FULLY COMMITTED TO GETTING THE DIET TO PASS LEGISLATION EXTENDING JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) I HAD A MUCH-PUBLICIZED LUNCH MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA SUNDAY AFTERNOON IN OKINAWA. HE DECIDED TO CANCEL OUR SCHEDULED GOLF OUTING DUE TO ALL THE PUBLICITY. INSTEAD, WE HAD A 2 AND A HALF HOUR LUNCH IN A LOCAL RESTAURANT, FOLLOWED BY AN HOUR AT MY HOUSE FOR COFFEE AND TO LOOK AT THE

VIEW OF MCAS FUTENMA WHILE HE KILLED TIME WAITING FOR HIS FLIGHT BACK TO TOKYO. HE DID NOT MEET WITH GOVERNOR NAKAIMA OR NAGO MAYOR SHIMABUKURO, EVEN THOUGH I OFFERED DURING LUNCH TO CALL THEM AND INVITE THEM OVER TO THE HOUSE. SO IN THE END, AS WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE DEFENSE MINISTER CAME TO OKINAWA ON A "PRIVATE VISIT" JUST TO MEET ME IN MY ROLE AS CONSUL GENERAL.

13. (C) THE MEETING WAS POLITE BUT A LITTLE HEATED AT FIRST. HE BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT WE HAVE HEARD EARLIER ABOUT DELAYING ANY DECISIONS ON FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY (FRF) IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL AFTER THE APRIL 22 BY-ELECTION. KYUMA THEN ARGUED STRONGLY THAT WE NEED A FIFTY-METER REVISION IN THE FRF PLAN IN ORDER TO GET GOV NAKAIMA TO AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT. I RESPONDED THAT WE DO NOT, AND THAT TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT IS A MISTAKE AND A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION IN OKINAWA.

14. (C) WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF REVISIONS, I SHOWED KYUMA THE MAP WE AGREED AT THE DPRI MEETING OF APRIL 13, 2006 (WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR THE ROADMAP'S MORE GENERAL MAP), AND EXPLAINED ALL THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH EACH OF THE SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING THE RUNWAY IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT NONE OF THESE ARE NEW IDEAS - ALL HAD BEEN VETTED AND DISCARDED AS UNWORKABLE TECHNICALLY AND/OR POLITICALLY. I STRESSED WE HAD ACCEPTED THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL, A PROPOSAL THAT WAS THE BEST CONSENSUS THE GOJ ITSELF COULD REACH INTERNALLY.

15. (C) I TOLD KYUMA THAT FRANKLY SPEAKING, BASED ON MY OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOJ IN THE DPRI PROCESS, THE GOJ COULD NOT MAINTAIN THIS CONSENSUS ON FRF IF WE WERE TO START A DISCUSSION ON MAKING ANY ADJUSTMENT AT ALL TO THE PLAN. HE RESPONDED THAT AS THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER, HE COULD MAKE THE DECISION AND MAINTAIN THE CONSENSUS HIMSELF. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT, AT THE RISK OF SOUNDING RUDE, I DOUBT ANYONE COULD, INCLUDING HIMSELF, AND AGAIN EXPLAINED THAT MANY OF THE PEOPLE ASKING FOR ADJUSTMENTS ARE DOING SO IN THE ABSTRACT, WITHOUT ANY REAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEMS EACH

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PROPOSAL PRESENTS.

16. (C) WE SPENT QUITE A WHILE STUDYING THE MAP OF THE FRF AND GOING OVER EACH OF THOSE PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, MOVING TOWARDS THE OCEAN RUNS INTO THE ISLANDS, MOVING TO THE LEFT INCREASES ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ON THE SEA GRASS, MOVING TO THE RIGHT PUTS IT INTO DEEPER WATER AND MAKES CONSTRUCTION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. HE SEEMED TO GET THE PICTURE, AND ADMITTED THAT GOVERNOR NAKAIMA'S AND MAYOR SHIMABUKURO'S CALLS FOR "REVISIONS" ARE MERELY FOR FACE-SAVING, SINCE THEY HAVE MADE THESE CALLS IN PUBLIC.

17. (C) I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WERE TO SUGGEST ANY CHANGES TO THE AGREED PLAN, WE THEN ALSO COULD EXPECT TO HEAR VOICES FROM WITHIN THE U.S. FOR CHANGES AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME IN THE MARINE CORPS WANT A LONGER RUNWAY. "THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE," HE REPLIED, "SINCE WE'VE ALREADY AGREED ON 1800 METERS." I TOLD HIM THAT IS EXACTLY THE POINT, WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON THIS PLAN. BUT IF THE GOJ STARTS ASKING FOR CHANGES, HOW CAN WE PREVENT SIMILAR CALLS FOR CHANGES FROM THE U.S. SIDE AS WELL? WE ARE TRYING TO MAINTAIN AND MOVE FORWARD ON A DELICATE CONSENSUS ABOUT A PLAN AGREED AFTER MANY HOURS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. REOPENING THAT CONSENSUS BY MAKING CHANGES TO THE RUNWAY LOCATION WILL ONLY DESTROY THAT CONSENSUS, DELAY THE ENTIRE PROJECT, AND PUT THE ENTIRE REALIGNMENT PLAN FOR OKINAWA AT RISK.

18. (C) I TOLD HIM IT'S LIKE THE GAME IN JAPANESE ARCADES, "MOGURA TATAKI" (WHACK-A-MOLE, THE GAME IN WHICH MOLES KEEP POPPING UP FROM HOLES AND YOU KEEP HAMMERING THEM DOWN). THAT'S WHAT WE'RE DOING NOW, TRYING TO KEEP THIS PROJECT ON TRACK. HE SMILED AT THIS, AND THE MOOD SEEMED TO LIGHTEN AT THAT POINT.

19. (C) I THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN MY VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN OKINAWA, AND WHY I THINK WE CAN BRING GOVERNOR NAKAIMA AROUND TO GET HIS COOPERATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, AND HIS REQUIRED APPROVAL FOR THE LANDFILL. IN MY VIEW, NAKAIMA WANTS TO GET THIS SETTLED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO HE CAN FOCUS

ON ECONOMIC ISSUES IN OKINAWA. BUT UNFORTUNATELY HE MADE PROMISES IN THE CAMPAIGN WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THEIR REAL MEANING. NOW HE IS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT, AND RECENTLY IS SHOWING MUCH MORE FLEXIBILITY IN FINDING AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM THOSE PROMISES.

¶10. (C) THE "NEGOTIATED OVER OUR HEADS" ISSUE IS SETTLED - THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM HAS TAKEN CARE OF THIS COMPLAINT. THE "CLOSED STATE IN THREE YEARS" IS FIXED AS WELL - ALL NAKAIMA WANTS IS A STATEMENT FROM KYUMA THAT THE GOJ WILL MAKE BEST EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DANGER AT FUTENMA; HE DOESN'T EVEN WANT TO HEAR HOW.

¶11. (C) THAT LEAVES THE "V" PLAN. RECENTLY THE GOVERNOR HAS REPEATED TO THE PRESS THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE VIEWS OF NAGO CITY. SO, I EMPHASIZED TO KYUMA, I'M CONFIDENT THAT IF WE BRING MAYOR SHIMABUKURO AROUND, THE GOVERNOR WILL COME AROUND AS WELL. AND I THINK WE CAN BRING SHIMABUKURO AROUND.

¶12. (C) I MET FRIDAY WITH THE THREE KU-CHO (DISTRICT MAYORS) OF THE NAGO CITY DISTRICTS DIRECTLY AROUND CAMP SCHWAB. AFTER DISCUSSION SIMILAR TO THAT ABOVE, AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE ACTUAL PLAN FOR FRF, THEY ALL SAID THAT THE PLAN WE HAVE AGREED TO IS OK FOR THEM, WITHOUT ANY REVISIONS OR ADJUSTMENTS. THEY CLAIMED IT WAS THE FIRST TIME ANYONE HAD ACTUALLY EXPLAINED THE

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PLAN TO THEM (AT THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN THE APRIL 13, 2006 MAP), AND THAT ALL THEY HAD SEEN BEFORE WAS THE MORE GENERAL MAP ATTACHED TO THE ROADMAP.

¶13. (C) BUT, THEY SAID, WE'VE BEEN ASKING THAT THE RUNWAY BE "PLACED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AWAY FROM THE TOWNS TOWARDS THE OCEAN". IN OUR VIEW, THEY CONTINUED, THE ROADMAP PLAN OF MAY 2006 IS JUST A CONCEPTUAL PLAN, SO NOBODY KNOWS WHERE THE ACTUAL BASELINE IS FOR THE RUNWAY LOCATION. SO COULDN'T THE TWO GOVERNMENTS JUST MAKE PUBLIC THE DETAILED FRF MASTER PLAN, AND WITHOUT ACTUALLY MAKING ANY CHANGES, STATE THAT IT HAD BEEN "ADJUSTED" OR "SLIGHTLY REVISED (SHUSEI IN JAPANESE)"? I RESPONDED THAT NO, WE COULD NOT SAY THAT. EVEN STATING THERE HAD BEEN A REVISION, EVEN IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN, WOULD OPEN UP THE CAN OF WORMS ABOUT MAKING CHANGES TO THE PLAN, AND PUT THE CONSENSUS AT RISK, SINCE WE COULD EXPECT CALLS FOR CHANGES FROM OTHER DISSATISFIED PARTIES AS WELL.

¶14. (C) HOWEVER, I SUGGESTED, HOW ABOUT IF, WHEN WE MAKE PUBLIC THE MASTER PLAN, AS IT IS NOW WITHOUT ANY CHANGES, BOTH GOVERNMENTS WERE TO STATE SOMETHING LIKE "IN AGREEING ON THE ROADMAP AND THE MASTER PLAN BOTH GOVERNMENTS GAVE STRONG CONSIDERATION TO LOCAL VIEWS AND THE DESIRE THAT THE RUNWAY BE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM THE TOWNS, AND WE HAVE PLACED THE RUNWAYS AS FAR TOWARD THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE." WE CANNOT SAY WE HAVE CHANGED THE PLAN, BUT WE COULD TRUTHFULLY SAY WE HAVE PLACED THE RUNWAY AS FAR TOWARDS THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE, SINCE THAT IS IN FACT WHAT WE DID IN AGREEING TO THE PLAN IN THE MAY 1, 2006 ROADMAP.

¶15. (C) THE THREE KU-CHO LIKED THIS APPROACH, AND SAID THEY WOULD MEET SOON WITH MAYOR SHIMABUKURO TO TRY AND PERSUADE HIM TO ACCEPT THE CURRENT PLAN, AND ALSO TO ASK HIM TO PERSUADE NAKAIMA. MY STRONG IMPRESSION, WHICH I CONVEYED TO KYUMA, IS THAT THEY ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT LOSING OR HAVING DELAYS IN THE ECONOMIC PROMOTION MEASURES.

¶16. (C) BASED ON THIS CONVERSATION, I TOLD KYUMA I THINK WE CAN BRING THE MAYOR AND GOVERNOR AROUND. THE BIGGEST MISTAKE WE COULD MAKE WOULD BE TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY AT ALL ON THE POINT OF REVISIONS TO THE PLAN. LANGUAGE SUCH AS THAT ABOVE COULD BE USED BY NAKAIMA TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC WE HAVE TAKEN HIS VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT, BYPASSING THE ISSUE OF ASKING FOR REVISIONS. I NOTED TO KYUMA THAT THE LANGUAGE OF "PLACING THE RUNWAYS AS FAR TOWARD THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE" IS LANGUAGE THAT THE GOVERNOR HIMSELF HAS USED WITH ME IN EXPLAINING HIS REQUESTS TO THE GOJ. THE GOVERNOR THEREFORE COULD EXPLAIN THAT THE MASTER PLAN HAS TAKEN HIS VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION.

¶17. (C) KYUMA RESPONDED THAT HE IS NOT AS OPTIMISTIC AS I THAT NAKAIMA CAN BE PERSUADED WITHOUT ANY REVISIONS TO THE PLAN, BUT HE AGREED THAT HE WOULD NOT EXPRESS ANY FLEXIBILITY TO THE GOVERNOR (DESPITE WHAT WE KNOW HE HAS BEEN SAYING IN PUBLIC, AND PERHAPS IN PRIVATE). I TOLD KYUMA I WOULD BE MEETING WITH MAYOR SHIMABUKURO AND GOVERNOR NAKAIMA SHORTLY TO TRY AND PUSH THEM FORWARD.

¶18. (C) I MENTIONED TO KYUMA THAT THERE ARE RUMORS IN OKINAWA TO THE EFFECT THE NAGO CONSTRUCTION MAGNATE NAKADOMARI IS PRESSURING THE NAGO MAYOR TO MOVE THE RUNWAY TOWARDS THE OCEAN IN ORDER TO GET MORE LANDFILL WORK FOR HIS COMPANY. KYUMA SAID HE IS AWARE OF THOSE RUMORS, BUT NOTED THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE THE FACT THAT SUCH RUMORS ARE WIDELY CIRCULATING WOULD IN ITSELF

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PUT AN END TO THIS PRESSURE, SINCE NAKADOMARI'S INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE WIDELY KNOWN, AND LEGAL ISSUES WOULD ENSUE. (NOTE: KYUMA DID NOT TELL ME HE HAD MET PRIVATELY THAT MORNING WITH NAKADOMARI, ALTHOUGH REPORTERS WHO WERE STAKING OUT HIS HOTEL TELL ME THAT HE DID.)

IRAQ

¶19. (C) WHEN I ASKED KYUMA WHAT HIS MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE IS NOW WITHIN MOD, HE REPLIED IT IS HIS EFFORT TO GET EXTENSION ON JAPAN'S SPECIAL LEGISLATION FOR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. HE NOTED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO DELAY THE ATTACK ON IRAQ, BUT NEVERTHELESS JAPAN FULLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. IN IRAQ, AND HE PERSONALLY IS FULLY COMMITTED TO GETTING AN EXTENSION TO THE LEGISLATION. HE ASSURED ME HE WILL GET THIS DONE. IT IS A SENSITIVE ISSUE POLITICALLY IN JAPAN, HE SAID, BECAUSE THE EXTENSION WOULD COME VERY CLOSE TO THE TIME OF THE UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS IN JULY. THIS IS ONE REASON, HE EXPLAINED, THAT JAPAN HAS DECIDED TO DELAY THE 22 MEETING. HE DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO WASHINGTON WHEN STILL EMPTY HANDED ON FRF IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS AND IRAQ LEGISLATION EXTENSION, SO IT IS BEST TO DELAY THE 22.

¶20. (C) PRESS. KNOWING THERE WERE MANY REPORTERS OUTSIDE WAITING FOR OUR DEPARTURE, WE AGREED THAT KYUMA WOULD SIMPLY SAY HE HAD COME TO OKINAWA TO HEAR "THIRD PARTY VIEWS" (MINE) ON THE SITUATION IN OKINAWA. WHEN TALKING TO THE PRESS, HE SAID THAT THE CONSUL GENERAL HAD STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT ISSUES, WITH BASE ISSUES THIRD ON THE LIST OF CONCERNS. HE ALSO SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WHETHER WE HAD DISCUSSED REVISIONS TO THE FRF PLAN THAT "THE U.S. VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN." IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS I TOLD THE PRESS "WE HAD A WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ISSUES AFFECTING OKINAWA." WITH RESPECT TO FRF AND REALIGNMENT, I SAID "BOTH AGREED IT IS IMPORTANT TO IMPLEMENT THE REALIGNMENT PLANS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, SINCE THE REALIGNMENT PLAN IS VERY MUCH TO THE BENEFIT OF OKINAWA. I AM CONFIDENT THAT MOST OKINAWANS WHO UNDERSTAND THE PLAN SUPPORT THIS."

¶21. (C) ALL IN ALL IT WAS A MOST INTERESTING AFTERNOON WITH KYUMA. I NOTE THAT DURING THE ENTIRE MEETING NOT ONCE DID KYUMA MENTION MOD VICE MINISTER MORIYA, EVEN THOUGH MORIYA HAS PLAYED THE KEY ROLE WITHIN MOD ON FRF. I HAD THE IMPRESSION KYUMA HAD MADE THE ASSUMPTION HE NEEDS TO OFFER REVISIONS TO NAKAIMA WITHOUT REALIZING THE REAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH REVISIONS, AND WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE FLEXIBLE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE GOVERNOR IS HEADING. I THINK HE UNDERSTANDS THOSE DIFFICULTIES BETTER NOW. HOPEFULLY HE WILL REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FLEXIBILITY TO THE GOVERNOR SO THAT THE GOVERNOR CAN BE PERSUADED TO COOPERATE WITH THE CURRENT PLAN.
MAHER